poprhythm
7c0340519c
Investigated recent Telegram alerts - no intrusion, both new hits trace to benign one-offs: calibre's linuxserver.io s6-init NOPASSWD setup (same pattern already whitelisted for obsidian) and lsyncd truncating its own status log (not evidence-clearing).
81 lines
4.9 KiB
YAML
81 lines
4.9 KiB
YAML
# Tune out stock-rule false positives observed on this specific host, so the
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# broad netdata "any Falco match" alarm only pages for things worth paging
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# for. Uses Falco's own user_* customization macros rather than disabling
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# whole rules, so the underlying security check stays active for everything
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# else. Add entries here as new noisy defaults turn up - don't let this list
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# grow into blinding Falco to anything actually meaningful.
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# "Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program" false-positives:
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# - pg_isready: fired every ~10s from inbox-zero-db's healthcheck touching
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# /etc/shadow - NSS/libc user-lookup behavior during process init, not
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# credential harvesting.
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# - lscr.io/linuxserver/obsidian, lscr.io/linuxserver/calibre: fires once per
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# container start from `sed -i s/CORRUPT_FILE/NOPASSWD/g /etc/sudoers` -
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# linuxserver.io's own s6-init NOPASSWD setup, same class of init-time file
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# touch. Same pattern confirmed on calibre 2026-08-19; scoped per-image
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# rather than by proc.name alone since any other linuxserver.io image will
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# hit this the first time it's added here too.
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- macro: user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities
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condition: >
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(proc.name = pg_isready)
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or (container.image.repository in ("lscr.io/linuxserver/obsidian", "lscr.io/linuxserver/calibre") and proc.name = sed)
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# "Fileless execution via memfd_create" fires from nvidia-ctk's
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# ldconfig-refresh hook, which runs via memfd_create by design every time
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# an NVIDIA-GPU container (e.g. ollama) starts - normal container-toolkit
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# behavior, not defense evasion. Scoped to the hook's own parent process
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# names rather than the ollama/ollama image, so drift detection stays live
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# for anything else that image does.
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- macro: known_memfd_execution_processes
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condition: (proc.pname in (nvidia-containe, nvidia-ctk))
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# "Drop and execute new binary in container" (output text: "Executing binary
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# not part of base image") false-positives on three known-benign sources,
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# all confirmed via docker logs falco (2026-08-08 to 2026-08-16):
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# - gitea: re-executes itself for git-shell commands (serv/hook/pre-receive/
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# post-receive) over SSH, which looks identical to a dropped binary.
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# Scoped to proc.name=gitea, not the whole container, so this
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# previously-compromised container still gets checked for any OTHER
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# unexpected binary.
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# - lscr.io/linuxserver/obsidian: Electron's normal /proc/self/exe
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# self-re-exec pattern (zygote/renderer/utility processes), fires ~6x
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# every time the container is recreated (~daily, likely watchtower).
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# Scoped to the whole image since this is normal Electron startup
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# behavior end to end, not one specific binary.
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# - tsl0922/ttyd (Synchronet BBS web terminal): telnet/pv/busybox-extras
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# installed via apk at container start and then used for the BBS's
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# normal telnet workflow. Scoped to those three binaries, not the image,
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# since this is a shell-access container where an unexpected binary is
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# more worth knowing about.
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- macro: known_drop_and_execute_activities
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condition: >
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(container.image.repository = "docker.gitea.com/gitea" and proc.name = gitea)
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or (container.image.repository = "lscr.io/linuxserver/obsidian")
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or (container.image.repository = "tsl0922/ttyd" and proc.name in (telnet, pv, busybox-extras))
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# "Redirect STDOUT/STDIN to Network Connection in Container" false-positives,
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# both confirmed recurring (not one-off) via netdata's alert history:
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# - gitea: sshd/sshd-session redirect the just-accepted SSH connection's
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# socket onto stdin/stdout/stderr via dup2 - this is simply how every SSH
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# server handles every session, not a reverse shell. Fires 4x per SSH
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# connection (sshd x2, sshd-session x2). Scoped to those two binaries in
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# this one container, not the whole image, since gitea itself spawning
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# this pattern from some other binary would still be worth flagging.
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# - fireflyiii/core: its wait-for-it.sh startup script opens a raw TCP
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# connection to the postgres container to poll for DB readiness, which
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# redirects stdio the same way a reverse shell would mechanically. Scoped
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# to the script's own cmdline, not the whole image.
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- macro: user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities
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condition: >
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(container.image.repository = "docker.gitea.com/gitea" and proc.name in (sshd, sshd-session))
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or (container.image.repository = "fireflyiii/core" and proc.cmdline contains "wait-for-it.sh")
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# "Clear Log Activities" false-positive: lsyncd (host systemd service, not a
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# container - running since 2026-07-29) truncates its own status file,
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# /var/log/lsyncd-status.log, as normal self-logging behavior. Matched via
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# the stock rule's fd.directory=/var/log check, not because it's actually
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# clearing evidence. Scoped to that one file, not all of /var/log, so any
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# other log-truncation in that directory still gets flagged.
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- macro: allowed_clear_log_files
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condition: (fd.name = "/var/log/lsyncd-status.log" and proc.name = lsyncd)
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