Confirmed 5 false positives over 2026-08-20 to 2026-08-25, all connecting
to ::1:8888 at ~21:3x daily - never a real mining-pool destination since
that's loopback, and every attempt failed instantly (nothing listens on
8888). Couldn't identify the source process (falco loses metadata for it
before it can be captured), but a real miner pool can never be localhost,
so excluding loopback fixes the false-positive class without weakening
the rule for actual remote pool connections.
Detects unauthorized miners (and other runtime threats) via Falco's
syscall/eBPF monitoring, following the 2026-08-06 gitea/xmrig
compromise. Wired into netdata rather than a new notification channel:
Falco exposes a Prometheus /metrics endpoint, netdata scrapes it, and a
new health.d alarm pages through netdata's already-configured Telegram
bot - no new alerting infra needed.
Includes a custom process-name rule for known miner binaries (the stock
Stratum-protocol rule wouldn't have caught the actual gitea incident,
which used a bare host:port with no scheme prefix), an outbound
miner-pool-port rule as a second layer, and rule_matching: all in the
Falco config - without it, Falco silently drops all but the first
matching rule per event, which would have suppressed our custom rule
whenever a stock rule also matched the same process.